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Abstract. Robotic systems are multi-dimensional entities, combining both hard-
ware and software, that are heavily dependent on, and influenced by, interac-
tions with the real world. They can be variously categorised as embedded, cyber-
physical, real-time, hybrid, adaptive and even autonomous systems, with a typi-
cal robotic system being likely to contain all of these aspects. The techniques for
developing and verifying each of these system varieties are often quite distinct.
This, together with the sheer complexity of robotic systems, leads us to argue that
diverse formal techniques must be integrated in order to develop, verify, and pro-
vide certification evidence for, robotic systems. Furthermore, we propose the fast
evolving field of robotics as an ideal catalyst for the advancement of integrated
formal methods research, helping to drive the field in new and exciting directions
and shedding light on the development of large-scale, dynamic, complex systems.
1 Introduction
Formal methods are used in a variety of domains to establish the correctness of both
hardware and software systems. Integrating formal methods so that they may be used in
a complementary fashion continues to be a difficult challenge that is only exacerbated
by the plethora of languages, logics, theorem provers, and model-checkers available.
In this paper, we propose robotic systems as an ideal candidate for the large-scale ap-
plication of integrated formal methods. In fact, it is a fast evolving area where only
integrated formal methods will suffice. Further, the application of integrated formal
methods in the robotics domain will enhance integrated formal methods research and
promote their adoption for other large-scale, engineered systems.
Robotic systems are complex and multi-dimensional, with a wide range of con-
cerns: software, hardware, human control, autonomous agent control, reconfigurability,
etc. They present numerous challenges for formal verification such as modelling a dy-
namic environment, providing sufficient evidence for certification and trust, modelling
multi-robot systems and, ensuring that autonomous robots are safely reconfigurable and
their decisions do not have dangerous side-effects. We discuss each of these challenges
in §2 as well as the current approaches to tackling them. Our position is that the use of
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integrated formal methods can mediate these difficulties. In §3, we illustrate the bene-
fits of integrated formal methods with respect to these challenges and outline potential
future directions for this research. Finally, §4 provides concluding remarks. The work
cited here is not a complete list, it is drawn from a larger survey of formal specification
and verification approaches for autonomous robotic systems 1, which is still in progress.
2 Formal Approaches to Robotic Challenges
This section discusses some of the most crucial challenges to the formal verification
of robotic systems and how current formal techniques approach them. First, we dis-
cuss the verification of a robotic system’s interaction with an unknown and dynamic
environment (§2.1). A further challenge is ensuring that verification methods can pro-
vide suitable evidence either for certification or to gain public trust (§2.2). Certain types
of robotic systems present specific challenges and we discuss the challenges posed by
modelling multi-robot systems in §2.3. Finally, §2.4 describes the challenges when ver-
ifying an autonomous or reconfigurable robotic system.
Other challenges include the formal refinement of robotic system specifications to
implementable code and ensuring that this final implementation corresponds to its spec-
ification in a provably correct way. The heterogeneous nature of robotic systems where
various programming languages are used in the implementation of distinct components
of the system means that this final specification-to-code step is not trivial. Since humans
interact with these systems, it is also necessary to model the human component of the
system, however, the verification of human behaviour is largely beyond the reach of
current formal verification approaches [34, 35].
2.1 Modelling the Physical Environment
To ensure that a robotic system can cope in real-world scenarios, it must be able to
react appropriately to an unknown and dynamic environment. When formally mod-
elling robotic systems, the environment is often ignored [19] or assumed to be static
and known, prior to the robot’s deployment [17, 23, 34], which is often neither possible
nor feasible in the real world. Other approaches abstract away from the environment
and rely on predicates representing sensor data about the environment [13]. This in-
sulates the high-level control from the detailed environment, but leaves issues such as
sensor and actuator correctness to be dealt with. Formal models of a robotic system’s
environment must bridge the reality gap, the difficulty of transferring models of the
environment to the real world [13]. This is especially problematic when real-world in-
teractions can impact safety. Reducing the impact of the reality gap often produces
intractable models which makes the verification task particularly difficult [11].
Two popular approaches are to either model or monitor the physical environment.
Temporal logics have been used to model robotic systems’ environments. For exam-
ple, safety rules and the environment of a robotic assistant captured in Probabilistic
1 http://tiny.cc/Luckcuck2018
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Temporal Logic (PTL) [34]. However, as the rules and environment become more com-
plex this approach may not be feasible due to the current limitations of model-checking
techniques, unless the properties to be verified can be simplified.
Specifying a monitor to restrict the robotic system to safe behaviours within its en-
vironment reduces the verification burden, as only the monitor needs to be verified [21].
For example, a robot’s environment can be captured by timed automata and safety prop-
erties written in temporal logic [2]. This can be used to build a run-time monitor for the
safety properties. This combination of verification methods can help to handle the dy-
namic environment.
Navigating an unknown and dynamic environment is a challenging task for robotic
systems and a number of navigation algorithms exist. However, not all can be employed
in safety-critical scenarios as they have not been verified [25]. This suggests that there
are limitations of current formal methods to verify these algorithms, and also leads
to hybrid approaches that have high computational complexity. KeYmaera is a hybrid
theorem prover that has been used to verify both the discrete and continuous behaviour
of robotic vehicle navigation using differential dynamic logic for hybrid systems [22].
2.2 Trust and Certification Evidence
Robotic systems are often safety-critical, such as those in nuclear or aerospace appli-
cations, and so require certification. Other robotic systems operate in unregulated areas
that require public trust, such as domestic assistants. Emerging robotic systems, like au-
tonomous vehicles, require both certification and public trust. Therefore, ensuring that
formal verification of robotic systems can provide appropriate trust and certification
evidence is crucial. Generally, robotic systems development provides insufficient evi-
dence for certification and public trust, which can hamper their adoption [34]. This is an
area where integrating formal methods with current non-formal engineering techniques
may prove fruitful.
Further to extensive testing, safety cases are generally used to provide evidence for
certification bodies. A safety case is a structured argument that is supported by a collec-
tion of evidence providing a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is
safe for a given application in a specific environment [9]. Automating the generation of
such documentation is a challenging task that must account for heterogeneous content
such as physical formulae from the design of the physical system, maintenance proce-
dures, and software (which itself, may be of a heterogeneous nature). Recent work in
this area includes a methodology for automatically generating such safety cases for the
Swift pilotless aircraft system using a domain theory and AUTOCERT [9].
Formal methods can provide suitable evidence for certification. For example, Is-
abelle/HOL and temporal logic have been used to formalise a subset of traffic rules
for vehicle overtaking [29]. Furthermore, a model-checking approach has been used to
capture the rules and expectations of pilots in order to to provide certification evidence
for an autonomous pilotless aircraft [33]. Here, it is verified that the agent controlling
the aircraft (in place of a pilot) preserves the rules and recommendations specified by
the Civil Aviation Authority (captured as temporal logic formulae).
There are currently no guidelines to help developers choose the most suitable formal
method to verify their system [20]. Similarly, regulators and certification bodies are
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often hesitant to suggest suitable formal methods for safety-critical systems – though
guidance has started to appear more recently. Regulators, developers, and academia thus
face the challenge of how to determine suitable and robust formal methods for particular
types of robotic system.
2.3 Multi-Robot Systems
Historically, the development of multi-robot systems has taken inspiration from biolog-
ical systems such as swarms of insects. Robot swarms are difficult to develop because
they are programmed at the microscopic level (that of individual robots) but are in-
tended to exhibit emergent, macroscopic behaviour (at the level of the whole swarm).
They are often developed bottom-up, using trial and error to form a swarm with the de-
sired emergent behaviour [23]. Ensuring that macroscopic behavioural requirements (or
restrictions) are implemented (or obeyed) at microscopic level can be difficult because
of their different abstraction levels.
Robot swarms can be quite large, and so a challenge when verifying robot swarms
using current model-checking techniques is state space explosion caused by the large
number of concurrent, interacting agents and the system’s dynamic environment [1].
This can be mitigated by making use of the homogeneity of the swarm’s robots, for
example by exploiting symmetry reduction [3] or abstracting the swarm to a single
state machine with a counting abstraction [19]. However, both of these approaches only
consider swarms with homogeneous behaviour.
The emergent behaviour of robot swarms can be captured using temporal logic [38]
and often lend themselves to probabilistic models. In particular, PRISM has been used
to encode probabilistic state machines which can then be checked for properties speci-
fied in a probabilistic temporal logic [19].
Further, robotic systems may consist of a team of heterogeneous robots. In haz-
ardous environments such as nuclear plants, it is conceivable that multiple robots may
be required in order to complete a specific task. Each robot would have a distinct role,
for example, a robotic arm to examine a piece of debris and a more mobile robot to
monitor, calibrate and mend the robotic arm should it malfunction. The robot team can
be verified at the macroscopic level, but at the microscopic level each robot must be
verified individually. For example, one robot in the team may be characterised by a
verifiably correct Z specification, whereas another may be verified by model-checking
its source code. The behaviour of the robot team might be different to the behaviour
of each individual robot and thus another approach may be used to verify the team’s
behaviour. It is not clear how best to link the verification approaches taken at these dif-
ferent levels of abstraction because the approaches most amenable to the verification of
each individual robot might be different.
2.4 Adaptation, Reconfigurability and Autonomy
A self-adaptive system continually alters its behaviour in a feedback loop that is driven
by its environment. A literature survey found that there are no standard tools for the
formal modelling and verification of self-adaptive systems [36]. Of the tools surveyed,
30% use model-checking. One avenue of research suggests using (both semi-formal
4
and formal) models to check run-time behaviour [6]. This agenda considers approaches
such as automatic test case generation and formal model-checking. The aim being to
reduce state explosion by quantifying as many variables as possible at run-time.
Related to this is the notion of a reconfigurable system, which senses its environ-
ment and makes a decision about how best to reconfigure itself to suit changes in its
requirements or the environment. Reconfiguration is essential for ensuring the fault tol-
erance of safety-critical robotic systems [32]. There are two key open questions when
applying formal methods to these systems: (1) how to specify and analyse a configu-
ration, and (2) how to compare different configurations of the same system [24]? The
design of reconfigurable hardware has received much attention, but autonomous soft-
ware reconfiguration remains a challenge [4]. One approach involves building a flexible
control system that can reconfigure itself once a fault is detected [5]. Z models can be
used to describe an arbitrary reconfigurable system [37]. The model provides a method
for describing and comparing different configurations of the system’s architecture.
Since reconfigurability requires the system to make an autonomous decision as to
how best to reconfigure itself, it is vitally important that the decisions made by the
system are rational, meaning that the system can explain its reasoning. This leads us to
model the motivations and decisions of the system, ideally as first class objects [13].
Agent-based systems are one way of describing autonomy; there are many different
models of agent systems, based on different models of autonomy. Agents are used to
model a robot’s interactions with other actors, its environment, and the physical envi-
ronment itself. For example, probabilistic temporal logics have been used for modelling
an autonomous mine detector robot, controlled by an agent, and its environment [16].
The model of the agent can be used for both design- and run-time verification.
A formal model of a style of agent system using Z has been devised that gives its
agents a formal semantics [12]. The interactions of multiple interacting agents can also
be modelled using finite state machines. These are converted into Alloy specifications
for automatic verification [26]. The size of these specifications meant that keeping the
models tractable was challenging.
Relating agent programs, written in an agent programming language, and agent
(verification) logics remains an open problem. One approach has been to define an
agent programming theory combining an agent programming language and verifica-
tion logic [15]. Program model-checking such as the Model-Checker for Multi-Agent
Systems (MCMAS), has been used to verify heterogeneous agents interacting with an
environment [7]; and Agent Java PathFinder (AJPF) [10], which can model-check pro-
grams written in a particular style of agent language.
3 Integrated Formal Approaches to Robotic Challenges
In §2, we outlined the challenges encountered when developing reliable robotics and a
number of current (non-integrated) approaches to addressing them. It is clear that only
by using a combination of specialised tools and methodologies can we achieve a high
level of confidence in software. For example, the NASA Remote Agent uses specialized
languages for each of the planner, executive, and fault diagnosis components [30].
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There is currently no general framework integrating formal methods for robotic
systems. However, §3.1 describes recent trends and some notable bespoke examples
of integrated formal methods (iFM) for robotics. In §3.2 we discuss how robotics and
iFM can benefit from one another. We do not ignore the important role that validation
techniques, such as testing and simulation, play in the development of robotic systems.
These too, should be integrated into the development process to be used alongside for-
mal methods [35].
3.1 Adopting iFM for Robotics
Current approaches to formal verification in robotics typically centre around one tool
or technique that is suited to verifying properties of a particular type (concurrency,
probability, etc.). It is clear from the increasingly complex nature of robotic systems
that this is not a sustainable approach to ensuring the correctness of these systems.
These approaches suffer from a number of drawbacks that are mostly caused by the
limitations of their logic or the tool being used.
A comparison of four different specification formalisms (CSP, WSCCS, Unity Logic,
and X-Machines) for specifying and verifying emergent swarm behaviour, concluded
that a blending of these formalisms offered the best approach to specify emergent swarm
behaviour as none was sufficient in isolation [14]. This claim is further supported by the
use of MAZE (an extension of Object-Z for multi-agent systems) that uses Back’s ac-
tion refinement to facilitate a top-down development process of the swarm, from the
macroscopic to microscopic level [31].
It is therefore clear that the use of iFM can help to mediate the issues surrounding
the development of robotic systems as has been illustrated by the following bespoke
examples. We outlined the importance of reconfigurable systems in §2.4, and a com-
bination of Event-B and the PRISM model-checker has been used to derive a recon-
figurable architecture for an on-board satellite system [32]. The combination of these
formal notations allows not only for the formal specification and derivation (via refine-
ment) of the system in Event-B, but also the probabilistic assessment of its reliability
and performance using PRISM.
The combination of AJPF for agent verification, Uppaal for timing properties and,
spatial reasoning has been used to verify the procedures for a driverless car joining
and leaving a vehicle platoon [17, 18]. This work verifies the cooperation between the
vehicles, and the abstract behaviour of the real physical vehicle. Related work uses
CSP‖B to correctly model a real physical platooning vehicle [8].
Finite State Processes (FSP) and piADL (pi-calculus combined with the Architec-
ture Description Language) have been combined to capture safety and liveness proper-
ties of multi-agent robotic systems [1]. The FSP specifications of the relevant safety
and liveness properties are transformed into Labelled Transition Systems, then the
agent programs and architecture (described in piADL) are checked to see if they satisfy
the required properties. Designed as a generic notation for modelling robotic systems,
RoboChart integrates the process algebra CSP with a graphical timed state machine
notation [28]. This allows graphical visualisation of the specification and automatic
model-checking of its behaviour. The use of a process algebra in these cases is ideal
for modelling communication across a channel with piADL and timed state machines,
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respectively, providing a robust model of the system’s state that could not be achieved
using a process algebra in isolation.
Furthermore, several views of the same system or component often require inte-
gration of analysis, even for one specification element. For example, model-checking,
model-based testing, and user evaluation have all been applied to the same robotic sys-
tem [35]. Each, however, works at a very different level of abstraction and formality and
so the challenge here is to integrate this breadth of techniques in a holistic framework.
3.2 Future Directions for iFM
The benefits of iFM are well known. Specifically with respect to robotics, iFM can: (1)
enable us to capture detailed physical environments by combining static and dynamic
models; (2) provide a formal mechanism for linking the macroscopic and microscopic
levels of multi-robot systems; (3) provide robust evidence for trust and certification,
and; (4) express the complex properties of adaptive, reconfigurable, and autonomous
systems. This unique set of challenges posed by robotics provides tangible targets for
iFM researchers. Thus, robotics can benefit from and be a catalyst for iFM research,
and the adoption of these techniques for large-scale, dynamic, and complex systems.
Integrating multiple approaches to verification for systems in the safety-critical do-
main presents its own set of familiar challenges, such as increased complexity and en-
suring the correctness of the integrated model. Until now, these challenges have gen-
erally been addressed using theoretical frameworks, small case studies, and prototype
tools. Robotic systems are a complex and practical field where iFM is crucial to prov-
ably correct advances and adoption. Further to these challenges, usability is a concern
from both perspectives. Firstly, the iFM community is tasked with providing a set of ro-
bust tools that are intuitive and usable for the developers of robotic systems. Secondly,
robotic systems should be developed with iFM in mind using a set of standardised,
modular constructs that are amenable to iFM.
Combining formal methods with different strengths and weaknesses, such as ex-
haustive model-checking and proof-based methods, provides a useful balance of com-
plexity and robustness. While model-checking exhaustively examines the system’s state
space to check if a property is preserved, formal proofs provide a step-by-step math-
ematical argument as to why the property holds. Although, both model-checking and
theorem proving generally involve abstracting to a formal specification in order to ver-
ify the system, an advantage of model-checking is that it can be used directly on the
implemented code, whereas theorem proving cannot. In contrast, theorem proving tech-
niques do not suffer from the explosion in state space that limits the complexity of the
properties that can be verified using model-checking. Formalisms that support formal
refinement of specifications, such as Event-B, facilitate a verification process that pro-
vides a proof of the properties that are verified at each level of abstraction. Integrating
model-checking and proof-based approaches to verification will provide fast identifica-
tion of bugs and a list of the properties that are verified using model-checkers, as well as
robust mathematical arguments for correctness in the form of proofs. These techniques,
in combination, can thus provide the more robust certification evidence required for
robotic systems.
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Robotic systems are layered entities containing both hardware and software com-
ponents. In general, each layer is built upon the lower layers and assumes that they
behave correctly. In this scenario it is likely that the formalisms and tools used for both
the verification and implementation of each layer are different. This presents a huge
challenge for ensuring the correctness of the entire system, and in particular, verifying
the interactions between these layers. Contemporary robotics software is often highly
modular, with components loosely connected. For example the Robot Operating System
(ROS) allows architectures comprising heterogeneous components, written in different
programming languages, which can interface with a range of hardware and software
components [27]. There will undoubtedly be different techniques relevant to, and op-
timal for, the verification and validation of each of the different components. These
include stochastic analysis of a learning component, a range of testing techniques for
a vision component, or model-checking of an autonomous decision-maker. These must
all be combined to provide a coherent and comprehensive analysis of the whole system.
We propose the verification of middleware architectures, such as ROS, as an ideal
starting point for this research agenda. For example, the specification and verification
of individual ROS nodes using pre- and post-conditions or assume-guarantee clauses,
written using a heterogeneous collection of logics, would prove useful here. This ap-
proach could also aid in the verification of heterogeneous teams of robots as discussed
in §2.3. It is clear that a common framework for translating between, relating, or in-
tegrating different formal methods and validation techniques will prove useful. Such a
framework would enable easy conversion between formalisms and verification tools.
This would facilitate the use of heterogeneous models that are each suited to a par-
ticular type of behaviour or property. Moreover, the use of iFM can save time in the
development process by avoiding duplicate specifications and exploiting different types
of verification tools for proving different properties of the same system.
4 Conclusions
Robotic systems are inherently multi-dimensional entities that combine both hardware
and software components that interact with humans and the physical world. These sys-
tems can be modelled in a variety of ways and thus must integrate verification and
validation techniques from the fields of embedded, cyber-physical, real-time, hybrid
adaptive and even autonomous systems. In §2, we discussed the challenges that are en-
countered when developing certifiably correct robotic systems and the current formal
approaches to tackling them. It is clear that current (non-integrated) formal methods are
not robust enough, particularly in isolation, to ensure the correctness of these systems.
Although not without its challenges, in §3, we have illustrated the benefits of employing
integrated formal methods in this setting and outlined future directions for this work.
Furthermore, we have argued that although robotics actually necessitates the use of in-
tegrated formal methods, integrated formal methods can utilise robotics as a viable and
impactful means for advancing integrated formal methods research and their adoption
for large-scale, complex systems. The challenges that we have outlined throughout this
paper can be achieved through funding streams such as EPSRC at a national level and
Horizon 2020 at an international level.
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